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Master's Thesis of International Studies

Revisiting the
Inclusion–Moderation Theory
in the Context of Malaysia and PAS

말레이시아와 범말레이시아이슬람당의
맥락에서 본 온건론

August 2019

Graduate School of International Studies
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국제학석사학위논문

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서울대학교 국제대학원
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Abstract

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Entering the 21st century, there has been a visible shift of extremist Islamic groups around the world becoming increasing moderate to adapt to both external and internal pressures. However, PAS, an Islamist party in Malaysia, has resisted moderation and has been actively advocating for the establishment of an Islamic State and extremist traditional Islamic laws, more specifically ‘hudud’. Based on the Inclusion–Moderation Theory of Robert Michels, PAS should have moderated to adapt to society to expand its interests and area of influence. In the case of PAS, moderation would have meant curbing its fervent advocacy of the establishment of the Islamic State and the push for the implementation of ‘hudud’. Despite participating in every single election PAS has defied the Inclusion–Moderation Theory’s expectations and has maintained its stance.

This paper aims to analyze the reasons for PAS' resilience and opportunistic moderation of the 2013 General Election.

Keyword : Inclusion–moderation thesis, Islamism, Malaysia, PAS, UMNO

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Abbreviations

ABIM	Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia (Malay: Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia)
AKP	Justice and Development Party (Turkish: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi)
FJP	Freedom and Justice Party (Arabic: Ḥizb al-Ḥurriyyah wa al-‘Adala)
JDP	Justice and Development Party (Turkish: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi)
MB	Muslim Brotherhood (Arabic: gammā‘at al-’iḥwān/al-ikhwan/el-ekhwan al-muslimīn)
PAS	Malaysian Islamic Party (Malay: Parti Islam Se-Malaysia)
PH	Alliance of Hope (Malay: Pakatan Harapan)
PKS	Prosperous Justice Party (Indonesian: Partai Keadilan Sejahtera)
RF	Reform Front (Persian: Jebhe-ye Eslahat)
UMNO	United Malays National Organization (Malay: Pertubuhan Kebangsaan Melayu Bersatu)

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Chapter 1: Introduction

In May 2018, the shocking Malaysian general election results produced an unanticipated outcome. For the first time since Malaysia's independence from the United Kingdom, the infamous United Malays National Organization (hereafter "UMNO") stepped down as the ruling party after reigning for over sixty years by losing to the Alliance of Hope (hereafter "PH"), effectively ending a seemingly never-ending tradition in Malaysian politics. Few of the major factors explaining UNMO's loss were the impact of the Malaysian Islamic Party (hereafter "PAS") and the influence of religious politicization. Malaysia has shown a consistent trend toward religious extremism, more specifically Islamism, in the form of religion permeating into politics. This is in contrast to the worldwide movement of Islamic countries and institutions moving towards moderation, otherwise known as Post-Islamism.

Islam has been a part of Malaysian life for centuries dating back to the Malacca Empire in the thirteenth century and therefore, Islam is integrated into the core of Malaysian culture. However, since its independence from the United Kingdom, religion was largely seen as a ceremonial institution which should be separated from politics but has been difficult to do so due to its inclusion in the Constitution,

and hence open to interpretation. Secularists have continued to claim that Islam should remain merely ceremonial and the foundations of the Malaysian Constitution are secular, which was asserted through the Supreme Court 1988 “Che Omar bin Che Soh v. Public Prosecutor” decision. However, during the final sentencing Sallah Abas, the Lord President of the Supreme Court of the case, stated “If the religion of Islam ... means only such acts as relating to rituals and ceremonies, the argument has no basis whatsoever. On the other hand, if the religion of Islam or Islam itself is an all-embracing concept, as is normally understood, which consists not only the ritualistic aspect but also a comprehensive system of life, including its jurisprudence and moral standard, then the submission has a great implication in that every law has to be tested according to this yard-stick” and this statement opened a room for new interpretations and debates.¹ In recent decades Malaysia has been undergoing a process of Islamic politicization. The current tension between Islam proponents and secularists is intensifying as they clash over Islam’s permeation into all parts of society, especially the government and politics. This recent politicization of religion has been led by the PAS and its

¹ Tamir Moustafa, *Constituting Religion: Islam, Liberal Rights, and the Malaysian State* (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 139.

support of Islam was soon echoed by other major parties, but most notably, the UMNO. Parties have justified their religionization through the Malaysian Constitution which states that “Islam is the religion of the Federation” in Article 3², a different interpretation of the constitution than former Lord President Sallah Abas. This is a turn of events as development and economic growth has been viewed as synonymous with the decreased role of religion, which is a view explored by Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart who claimed that “in post-industrial societies the trajectory of modernity has been one of erosion of religious functions and values in the public sphere”.³ Malaysia’s GDP has jumped from 1.916 US Billion Dollars in 1960 to 314.71 Billion US Dollars in 2017,⁴ so its GDP has jumped over 160-fold which is a remarkable achievement.

Malaysia’s Islamization has been a part of a larger historical Islamization movement of Southeast Asia. Islam was first introduced

² Yvonne Tew, "Constitutionalizing and Politicizing Religion in Contemporary Malaysia," *Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia* (Kyoto, Japan) 2018, <https://kyotoreview.org/issue-23/constitutionalizing-and-politicizing-religion-in-contemporary-malaysia/>.

³ Pippa Norris, *Sacred and Secular: Religion And Politics Worldwide*, ed. Ronald Inglehart, Second ed. (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 146.

⁴ "GDP (current US\$)," in *The World Bank Data* (World Bank, 2017). <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=MY>.

in Southeast Asia through trade as Islamic Indians, mostly from the Gujarat region, and Southeast Asian traders spread Islam across the entire region during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries⁵. An additional factor was the active Sufis, Muslims who see Muhammad as their leader and spiritual guide, who acted as missionaries of Islam⁶. But the most important element was the Malacca Sultanate's adoption of Islam as a national religion. As Islam was institutionalized it quickly seeped into society.⁷ As a region that was under the Malacca Sultanate, Malaysia naturally accepted Islam, and also included portions of modern-day Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.

After its transfer, Islam in Southeast Asia has been shaped into different forms based on ethnic groups of Thai, Burmese, Malay, Marano, Tausug, Bahasa Indonesia, Javanese, and Chinese.⁸ Other

⁵ Tushar Prabhune "Gujarat Helped Establish Islam in SE Asia," *Times of India* (Mumbai, India) 2011, <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/ahmedabad/ampnbspgujarat-helped-establish-islam-in-se-asia/articleshow/11262585.cms>.

⁶ "Islam in Southeast Asia," *Islam, Youth & New Media* (Berkeley, CA) 2016.

⁷ "Islam in Southeast Asia."

⁸ Ali Houissa, "History of Islam in Southeast Asia," (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Library, 2019). <http://guides.library.cornell.edu/IslamSoutheastAsia>.


factors that have led to the divergences are connected to governmental policies and whether the Muslims compose of the majority or the minority of the population⁹. While Islam has been a part of Southeast Asian life, the actual politicization movement of using Islam as a political weapon started appearing from the late 1990s. It began with the Dakwah movements sprouting in different parts of Southeast Asia with the goal of creating a strong Islamic identity. Depending on the academic field, this movement has been called an array of titles that range from “Revivalism” to “Islamization”¹⁰. The ways that Islam has influenced politics has been all-encompassing, ranging from debates on headscarves, in Indonesia and Malaysia, to the active discrimination against particular ethnic groups, in Myanmar.

Within this context, Malaysia has been an Islamic nation for centuries. There has been a visible trend of the Islamic politicization especially since the 1980s, led by UMNO and PAS, and has penetrated into politics. Since its humble beginning, PAS has developed an identity of acting as the defender of traditional Islam which has continued to today.

⁹ Vincent Houben, "Southeast Asia and Islam," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 588 (2003): 158.

¹⁰ Houben, "Southeast Asia and Islam," 163,67.

Estimate of the Muslim Population in the Malay Archipelago from 1950 to 2020¹¹



	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010	2020
Malaysia Population	6,109,907	8,140,405	10,852,505	13,763,441	18,103,341	23,273,615	27,913,990	33,479,579
Muslim Population	3,057,397	4,073,459	5,430,594	7,284,989	10,612,178	14,047,954	16,848,884	20,208,274
Muslim Population Percentage	50.04%	50.04%	50.04%	52.93%	58.62%	60.36%	60.36%	60.36%

With the number of the Muslim population expected to grow in the future, Islam will continue to remain as one of the most important factors in Malaysian politics. However, there is one point to consider which makes these statistics misleading. Based on Article 160 of the Malaysian Constitution, all Malay people have to proclaim that they are Muslims by law. Therefore, even if any Malay person

¹¹ Houssain Kettani, "Muslim Population in Asia: 1950 – 2020," *International Journal of Environmental Science and Development* 1, no. 2 (2010): 148.

is in a fact an atheist he or she will claim that he or she is a Muslim. This misconstrued nature of this statistic is bolstered due to Article 153 of the Malaysian Constitution as it grants privileges and affirmative actions to the Malay people by establishing quotas for entry into the civil service, public scholarships, and public education. While there were historical justifications and colonial influences for this law, today it is seen as a form of discrimination against other ethnicities, such as the Chinese and Indians. Nonetheless, whether the statistics are skewed or relevant, it does not change the fact that Islam will continue to remain controversial and impact the lives of all who stay in Malaysia.

1.1 Research Questions and Purpose of the Thesis

This research begins with two fundamental questions about Malaysia's religious integration into politics: "what explains the increase in the politicization of Islam in Malaysia?" and what are the "causes and variables that incentive parties to use religion?". The research will be based on PAS' political party platforms and its use of religion as a tool to increase its influence. For this purpose, this paper will first analyze the meaning of politicization of Islam and how has Islam's politicization varied over time in Malaysia, especially leading up to major elections. Furthermore, the necessary analysis

will include the party development of a major rival party the UNMO and other smaller parties, mainly from alliances, which contributed to religious politicization. Finally, additional variables that incentivize these political parties to utilize religion will be analyzed. While there has been a visible trend towards moderation, or a visible trend of shifting from Islamism to Post-Islamism, around the world PAS has remained steadfast in its ambition to create an Islamic State and implement strict traditional Islamic laws, otherwise known as ‘hudud’. Hudud is “in Islamic jurisprudence, the term refers to fixed and mandatory punishments for certain offenses mentioned in the Qur‘ān and sunnah... In the second half of the twentieth century, political movements emerged in many parts of the Muslim world which aimed to establish an Islamic state and enforce shari‘ah.”¹² Therefore hudud is a part of Sharia law and not two separate entities. An example of its proposal from PAS is the amputation of the right hand for the first offense for theft¹³. The main purpose of this paper is to find the causes and variables that caused the increase in religious

¹² Rudolph Peters, "Ḥudūd," (Oxford, United Kingdom: The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World).

¹³ Anith Adilah, "Hudud Law in Malaysia, Brunei and Aceh: How They Stack Up," *Malay Mail* (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia) 2018, <https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2018/08/16/hudud-law-in-malaysia-brunei-and-aceh-how-they-stack-up/1662987>.

politicization by analyzing the results from the 1986 general election to the 2018 general election.

PAS is a relevant study for its steadfast position on its Islamist ideology despite the changing world's view on Islamism. Iran's Reformist Movement, Egypt's Center Party, Morocco's Justice and Development Party, Turkey's Justice and Development Party, and Tunisia's Ennahda's, all once Islamist parties have transitioned into Post-Islamism and this reveals that this movement is happening worldwide. There are countless explanations that range that are both over-arching and regional which are attributed as structural, political opportunity, or simple failure. Despite this widespread movement, PAS has stood against change. It is important to review what would incentivize an extremist political party to hold onto to radical ideologies, despite the irrationality or seemingly alienating policies. As a political party, it has to act to win as most votes as possible to increase its area of influence, while pursuing Islamism seemingly seems to have a poor correlation with success.

1.2 Analytical Framework


To analyze the moderation of PAS, PAS will be viewed through the Inclusion-moderation Theory, hereafter "Moderation Theory". The Moderation Theory posits that political parties will

eventually abandon radical and extremist platforms and pursue more moderate platforms in order to become more successful in elections. This theory is explained through three causal mechanisms.

The first mechanism is the ‘dynamics of electoral competition’. As radical parties are organized as an electoral party aiming to maximize their vote share, radical parties prioritize electoral calculations over ideological goals. They have strong incentives to comply with democratic rules even if they do not hold deep democratic convictions. The second mechanism is the ‘threat of state repression’. Radical parties fear state repression checking their radical tendencies. Revolutionaries become moderates not as a result of ideological metamorphosis or civic learning but because of strategic interests. The third mechanism is the ‘organizational resources and limits’. Radical parties must now facilitate the incorporation of the marginalized and underrepresented societal groups into democratic politics. In this sense, increased competition is paralleled with increased participation in politics¹⁴.

¹⁴ Günes Murat Tezcür, *Muslim Reformers in Iran and Turkey: The Paradox of Moderation (Modern Middle East Series)* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2010), 30–31.

Figure 1. Gurses Graph Causal Factors of
Moderation Theory¹⁵



In order to determine whether PAS has moderated two indicators will be used to determine PAS's extremism. As an Islamist party, as mentioned above, its main goal is to establish an Islamic State. Therefore, the two indicators are PAS' support for the establishment of an Islamic State and its support for the implementation of extremists laws, mainly 'hudud'. While there may be wide-ranging definitions of moderation, the two indicators reflect active discrimination against certain groups and the promotion of a singular group, the Bumiputra. Furthermore, the extreme

¹⁵ Tezcür, *Muslim Reformers in Iran and Turkey: The Paradox of Moderation (Modern Middle East Series)*, 31.

punishments, of the hudud, is largely seen as out of date in today's time.

The election outcomes will have been set as 1986 through 2018. This is because it is from the 1980s when the 'ulumas' take the reins of PAS leadership and extremist values have been properly institutionalized within PAS ranks. While PAS was formed in 1951 by Muslim clerics, the party did not have a clear identity as an Islamist Party until the 1980s¹⁶.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

2.1 Inclusion–Moderation Theory

Robert Michels was one of the first to conceptualize the Moderation Theory through his book "*Political Parties*". By analyzing the Social Democratic Party of Germany, he showed that despite the party's fervent commitment to the lower classes, which was revolutionary at its time, eventually, this spirit subsided. He places

¹⁶ Walid Jumblatt Abdullah, "Inclusion–moderation or Political Opportunity? Lessons from the Case of Parti Islam Se–Malaysia (Pan–Malaysian Islamic Party, PAS)," *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 56, no. 4 (2018/10/02 2018): 411, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14662043.2018.1517958>.

the reason for moderation as the party's pursuit of votes and organizational survival. By participating in politics, the Social Democratic Party realized that advocating radical ideologies alienates a large population, and therefore parties have to curb their extremist front to maximize their chance of winning in the elections¹⁷.

Gunes Tezcür builds on Michels' theory by adding causal mechanisms in his book the "*Muslim Reformers in Iran and Turkey: The Paradox of Moderation*". He claims that the three main causal components of moderation theory: state repression, dynamics of electoral competition, and resources of the groups organized as vote-seeking parties¹⁸. He also adds that there is a difference between 'Behavioral Moderation'¹⁹, which involves accommodative and nonconfrontational strategies instead of more confrontational and contentious ones, which leads to 'Ideological Moderation'²⁰, which involves incorporation of democratic symbols and respect for political

¹⁷ Robert Michels, *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy* (New York, NY: Dover, 1959), 334.

¹⁸ Tezcür, *Muslim Reformers in Iran and Turkey: The Paradox of Moderation (Modern Middle East Series)*, 31.

¹⁹ Tezcür, *Muslim Reformers in Iran and Turkey: The Paradox of Moderation (Modern Middle East Series)*, 31.

²⁰ Tezcür, *Muslim Reformers in Iran and Turkey: The Paradox of Moderation (Modern Middle East Series)*, 32.

pluralism. Change in Behavioral Moderation will lead to changes in Ideological Moderation.

2.2 Inclusion–Moderation Theory on Islam

While the Moderation Theory began as a method to analyze the behavior of European parties, the use of the theory has been applied to Islamic Parties, with the rise of Islamic extremism around the world.

There have been several supporters of Michel's Theory. Gunes Tezur, in his journal "*The Moderation Theory Revisited: The Case of Islamic Political Actors*", bases his research on an Iranian Islamist Party Reform Front (hereafter "RF") and Turkish Secularist Party Justice and Development Party (hereafter "AKP"). Tezcur shows how moderation is possible in both Islamist and secularist parties and claims that "Ideological transformations are accompanied by behavioral change guided by strategic interests... Moderation is not an unavoidable and universal process."²¹

Mehmet Gurses offers a view of the Moderation Theory in his journal, "*Islamists, Democracy, and Turkey: A Test of the Inclusion–*

²¹ Günes Murat Tezcür, "The Moderation Theory Revisited: The Case of Islamic Political Actors," *Party Politics* 16, no. 1 (2010/01/01 2009): 83, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068809339536>.

moderation Hypothesis” by stating that “...as Islamists interact with democratic institutions they experience a transformation and adopt a more moderate stance toward democracy”²². By analyzing the AKP Gurses reveals that participation leads to favorable attitudes toward democracy however, Islamist parties are wary of the fact of whether they actually have a chance of winning elections²³. Essentially Islamist parties will favor democracy and will moderate depending on how much power they wield and what issues are at stake, but does mention that moderation is not guaranteed.

Jeremy Menchick noted in his book section “*Crafting Indonesian Democracy?*” that several Islamist parties have clearly moderated over time and made several concessions by eventually accepting and acknowledging democracy and its processes.²⁴ An additional point made by Menchick is that “inclusion of Islamists in the democratic bargain means that the negotiating partners of

²² Mehmet Gurses, "Islamists, Democracy and Turkey: A Test of the Inclusion–moderation Hypothesis," *Party Politics* 20, no. 4 (2014/07/01 2012): 646, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068812448688>.

²³ Gurses, "Islamists, Democracy and Turkey: A Test of the Inclusion–moderation Hypothesis," 649.

²⁴ Jeremy Menchik, "Crafting Indonesia Democracy: Inclusion–Moderation and the Sacralizing of the Postcolonial State," in *Democratic Transition in the Muslim World – A Global Perspective*, ed. Alfred Stepan (New York NY: Columbia University Press, 2018), 168.

Islamists, most often secular nationalists and the secular institutions of the postcolonial state, must cede ground on important policy issues”²⁵. Therefore, moderation is a result of not only Islamist parties but the concession of other parties involved.

On the other hand, there have been several skeptics of the Moderation Theory. Skeptics either deny moderation, depending on their own definition of moderation, or do not necessarily deny that parties moderate, but rather attribute moderation to region-specific factors rather than the simple over-arching explanation of participation in elections. Michel Buehler, in his journal *“Revisiting the Inclusion–Moderation Thesis in the Context of Decentralized Institutions: The Behavior of Indonesia's Prosperous Justice Party in National and Local Politics”*, claims that parties abandon radical agendas because of the ‘the strategic pursuit of their interests under certain institutional conditions’²⁶. Based on his analysis of Prosperous Justice Party (hereafter “PKS”), an Islamist Indonesian party, he

²⁵ Menchik, "Crafting Indonesia Democracy: Inclusion–Moderation and the Sacralizing of the Postcolonial State," 164.

²⁶ Michael Buehler, "Revisiting the Inclusion–Moderation Thesis in the Context of Decentralized Institutions: The Behavior of Indonesia's Prosperous Justice Party in National and Local Politics," *Party Politics* 19, no. 2 (2013/03/01 2012): 211, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068812462933>.

claims that the party moderated after its influence in politics grew and as the potential to receive a larger share of the votes increased. The party moderated by rejecting Islamism and accepting religious pluralism. An example is the acceptance of women in leadership positions and allowing “non–Muslims” to enter the Party²⁷.

Carrie Wickham in her journal “*The Path to Moderation: Strategy and Learning in the Formation of Egypt's Wasat Party*” defines moderation as “Ideological moderation refers to the abandonment, postponement, or revision of radical goals that enable an opposition movement to accommodate itself to the give and take of “normal” competitive politics.”²⁸ Based on her analysis of the Wasat Party, an Egyptian party, she is skeptical of the moderation of Islamist parties. She believes that Huntington’s Participation–moderation does not seem to hold in authoritarian regimes and that moderation is not feasible in a nation without any democratic background²⁹. She, alongside Gurses, believes that the opposite of

²⁷ Buehler, "Revisiting the Inclusion–Moderation Thesis in the Context of Decentralized Institutions: The Behavior of Indonesia's Prosperous Justice Party in National and Local Politics," 216.

²⁸ Carrie Wickham, "The Path to Moderation: Strategy and Learning in the Formation of Egypt's Wasat Party," *Comparative Politics* 36, no. 2 (2004): 206, <https://doi.org/10.2307/4150143>.

²⁹ Wickham, "The Path to Moderation: Strategy and Learning in the For

moderation is a democracy. Therefore, Wickham is skeptical of the Wasat Party's moderation as she believes that the party moderated to gain a legal foothold through votes to achieve its real goals, essentially being wolves in lambs clothing³⁰. Any moderation is a temporary measure to implement their original goals, such as establishing Islamic States, when they have a better foothold in politics. Regarding the relationship between Islam and democracy "The struggles for democratization in Turkey, Iran, and Indonesia offer similar lessons. There is no guarantee, indeed it is unlikely, that movements of Islamic revival or renewal will be uniformly conducive to democratization. What is more certain is that democracy is unlikely to grow and thrive in Muslim countries until political actors who are striving for it are also able to "frame" their discourse in a publicly recognizable Islamic idiom. Calls for the privatization of Islam as a condition for modern democracy in Muslim countries will only produce anti-democratic Islamist responses. By contrast, the public reflexive elaboration of Islam's normative traditions in response to modern challenges, political learning experiences, and global discourses has a chance to generate various forms of public civil

mation of Egypt's Wasat Party," 223.

³⁰ Wickham, "The Path to Moderation: Strategy and Learning in the Formation of Egypt's Wasat Party," 224.

Islam which may be conducive to democratization”³¹.

Payhwa Sumita analyzed the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in her journal “*Pathways of Islamist Adaptation: The Egyptian Muslim Brothers’ Lessons for Inclusion Moderation Theory*”. Based on her research she has revealed that there are two moderation mechanisms which are ‘political learning’ and ‘organizational specialization’³². The case studies of MB (Muslim Brotherhood) and FJP (Freedom and Justice Party) revealed that “...strategic adaptation can occur without being comprehensive or irreversible along all dimensions.”³³

Most of the readings above more or less admit that parties have moderated to some degree, and rather disagree on Michel’s Theory, that participating in elections is enough for parties to moderate. However, in the case of PAS, it has remained resilient in its support for Islamism, which makes it a particular case.

³¹ José Casanova, "Civil Society and Religion: Retrospective Reflections on Catholicism and Prospective Reflections on Islam," Article, *Social Research* 68, no. 4 (2001): 1075–76.

³² Sumita Pahwa, "Pathways of Islamist Adaptation: The Egyptian Muslim Brothers’ Lessons for Inclusion Moderation Theory," *Democratization* 24, no. 6 (2017/09/19 2017): 1067, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2016.1273903>.

³³ Pahwa, "Pathways of Islamist Adaptation: The Egyptian Muslim Brothers’ Lessons for Inclusion Moderation Theory," 1080.

2.3 PAS and Malaysian Islamism

Farish Noor provides the most comprehensive history of PAS and its relationship with Islamism. Through his book “*The Malaysian Islamic Party PAS 1951–2013: Islamism in a Mottled Nation*” Noor shows how PAS used Islam as a weapon to achieve its goals. Burhanuddin al-Helmy was the first to take PAS by the helm and help it grow into a proper party by having “grated together elements of Islamist, nationalist, Socialist, and reformist thought”³⁴. As a result, al-Helmy fervently opposed any colonial influence and began by rejecting the colonially drawn borders that had been created to divide Muslims. The next leader built on al-Helmy’s platform by advocating ethnonationalism and pro-Malay rights³⁵. Furthermore, there were domestic and international effects. Internally, during the 1980s, Mahathir Mohamed became the leader of UMNO and campaigned for an Islamic identity³⁶. This started off a battle between PAS and UMNO to be the face of Islam, which pushed PAS to adopt

³⁴ Farish A. Noor, *The Malaysian Islamic Party PAS 1951–2013: Islamism in a Mottled Nation* (Amsterdam, Netherlands: Amsterdam University Press, 2014), 64.

³⁵ Noor, *The Malaysian Islamic Party PAS 1951–2013: Islamism in a Mottled Nation*, 69.

³⁶ Noor, *The Malaysian Islamic Party PAS 1951–2013: Islamism in a Mottled Nation*, 102.

more extreme and traditional elements of Islam. Lily Zubaidah Rahim claims in her journal *"The Crisis of State-led Islamization and Communal Governance in Malaysia"* that by "out-Islamizing" the Islamist opposition party PAS, UMNO hoped to deprive the Islamist party of monopolizing the Islamic discourse, thereby enhancing UMNO's Islamic credentials and legitimacy. However, UMNO's attempts at out-Islamizing PAS pushed the Islamist party toward an even more conservative theological stance, which included the promotion of hudud laws differentiating itself further from UMNO."³⁷ Externally, the 1970s were a period where Malaysians educated from abroad returned and entered the ranks of many Islamic parties, notably PAS, many of who were educated by educational institutions established by the Muslim Brotherhood located in Egypt.³⁸ The educated eventually formed Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia (hereafter "ABIM"), led by the future PAS president Anwar Ibrahim. ABIM initially fervently campaigned for a call to return to the basics

³⁷ Lily Zubaidah Rahim, "The Crisis of State-led Islamization and Communal Governance in Malaysia," in *Muslim Secular Democracy: Voices from Within*, ed. Lily Zubaidah Rahim (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 169.

³⁸ Anthony Bubalo and Gregory Fealy, "Joining the Caravan? The Middle East, Islamism and Indonesia," *Lowy Institute Papers* 05 (2005): 14–15.

and the true teachings of Islam. This movement was complementary to PAS, as ABIM even campaigned for PAS during the general elections³⁹.

Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr shows in his book “*The Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of State Power*” how religion has been treated in Malaysia. He observed how states responded to the challenge of Islam by becoming rejectionist secularists, opportunistic Islamizers or thoroughgoing Islamizers,⁴⁰ with Malaysia falling into the third category. Thoroughgoing Islamizers were believed to be “Islamization of society has occurred under the aegis of the state, and in far more thoroughgoing fashion than in Egypt or Jordan”. This meant that these nations build stronger alliances with traditional Islamic institutions and incorporated Islamic symbols and values to a greater extent into state ideology and its workings⁴¹.

2.4 PAS and Inclusion–Moderation Theory

Walid Abdullah attempts, and the only to do so, to explain PAS’

³⁹ Noor, *The Malaysian Islamic Party PAS 1951–2013: Islamism in a Mottled Nation*, 95.

⁴⁰ Sayyed Vali Reza Nasr, *Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of State Power*, ed. John Esposito (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2003), 21.

⁴¹ Nasr, *Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of State Power*, 24.

relationship through the Moderation Theory, in his journal *"Inclusion–Moderation or Political Opportunity? Lessons from the Case of Parti Islam Se–Malaysia (Pan–Malaysian Islamic Party, PAS)"*. Abdullah argues that the reasons PAS moderate or do not are based on political opportunity not simple participation in elections⁴². Therefore, all alliances were based on "political expediency" rather than "genuine affection"⁴³. Moreover, he claims that what was rather more important in understand parties were the 'personalities', or leaders, and this is especially true in an environment where institutions are weak since charismatic leaders are able to bind people together.⁴⁴ Abdullah concludes by claiming that inclusion cannot be a catch–all explanation for the moderation of Islamist parties and that moderation should not be understood as a linear process.⁴⁵ While Abdullah provides into insight into PAS's

⁴² Abdullah, "Inclusion–moderation or Political Opportunity? Lessons from the Case of Parti Islam Se–Malaysia (Pan–Malaysian Islamic Party, PAS)," 408.

⁴³ Abdullah, "Inclusion–moderation or Political Opportunity? Lessons from the Case of Parti Islam Se–Malaysia (Pan–Malaysian Islamic Party, PAS)," 419.

⁴⁴ Abdullah, "Inclusion–moderation or Political Opportunity? Lessons from the Case of Parti Islam Se–Malaysia (Pan–Malaysian Islamic Party, PAS)," 420.

⁴⁵ Abdullah, "Inclusion–moderation or Political Opportunity? Lessons from

relationship he largely ignores the overall trend of PAS and its relationship with Islamism.

Chapter 3: PAS Dilemma

Trend of Islamism

Within this transition from Islamism to Post-Islamism, there are two key patterns which are democracy and violence.

The first point of contention is Islam and democracy. Islam has had a tricky relationship with democracy beginning with a clash between the concepts of the Islamists' "sovereignty of god" and Post-Islamists "sovereignty of the people". Until recently, there was a widespread belief that Islam and democracy were simply incompatible, a view spearheaded by Samuel Huntington. He claimed that "not all societies or civilizations are likely to develop democratic institutions" and he included the Muslim community. In addition, he claimed, Muslims view democracy as a Western institution and that "Conflict along the fault line between Western and Islamic

m the Case of Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party, PAS)," 421-22.

civilizations has been going on for 1,300 years”.⁴⁶ However, Hefner offers a new perspective called “Civil Islam” and claims that “modern ideals of equality, freedom, and democracy are not uniquely Western values, but modern necessities compatible with, and even required by, Muslim ideals”⁴⁷. Civil Islam rejects the notion of an Islamic state and promotes values of free speech, participation, and toleration. Hefner’s view is observable in the cases of Turkey and Egypt. In the case of Turkey, the AKP, an Islamist Party, actively espoused Islamist values. It denied and devalued democracy as a mechanism that conflicts with the Islamist system⁴⁸, furthermore, it opposed establishing good relations with the West and the European Union (hereafter “EU”), even going so far as to call the EU a “Catholic Club”⁴⁹. Eventually, it shifted its stance adopting Post-Islamism, as Islamism’s popularity dropped significantly as the extreme rules were wearing on the people. Now it invests in democracy mainly to protect and legitimize itself. Moreover, in order to bolster its democratic stance, it reached out to the EU and called for a Catholic

⁴⁶ Fré'dé'ric Volpi, *Political Islam: A Critical Reader* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2011), 161.

⁴⁷ Volpi, *Political Islam: A Critical Reader*, 167–68.

⁴⁸ Asef Bayat, *Post-Islamism: The Changing Faces of Political Islam* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2013), 72.

⁴⁹ Bayat, *Post-Islamism: The Changing Faces of Political Islam*, 84.

marriage between Turkey and the EU⁵⁰. In terms of Egypt, Carrie Wickham demonstrates that there has been a trend in Egypt that is comparable to Turkey. Initially, Egypt was ruled by the Muslim Brotherhood (hereafter “MB”), an Islamist Party. MB’s stance was evident in the Deputy Supreme Guide Ma’moun Hudeibi statement in the Harvard International Review which read “We, the Muslim Brotherhood, demand that these particular Islamic injunctions be adhered to and acted upon. They cannot be disregarded, neglected, or their application and enforcement ignored”. In addition, it rejected any Western values and institutions, such as democracy⁵¹. However, eventually, the Muslim Brotherhood lost its grace from the people and collapsed with the Wasat Party replacing it. The Wasat Party is still regarded a relatively conservative party, but it has made concessions to civic rights, such as extending citizenship for women and never citing god as a source of sovereignty. Both countries reveal that while many Islamist Parties have espoused establishing an Islamist state, their view has shifted into embracing democracy either out of sincere motivations or to use it to create an environment to use democratic values to protect itself.

The second point of contention is Islam and violence. Ever

⁵⁰ Bayat, *Post-Islamism: The Changing Faces of Political Islam*, 92–94.

⁵¹ Volpi, *Political Islam: A Critical Reader*, 175.

since the 9/11 attacks, the Middle East and Islamic groups have been associated with terrorism by many media outlets and academics alike, which this view eventually shared by the public in many parts of the world, particularly the West. This view only solidified with terrorist attacks in several major cities in Western Europe, such as London and Paris. With jihadi sentiments rising Thomas Heghammer points out a global jihadist movement composed of extremists and the Global jihadist ideologues argue that an Islamic state should be established in Egypt⁵². He analyzed the Iraqi movements and points at that their leaders created clever strategies to mobilize potential jihadists with a high probability of this trend increasing. However, one can also realize how these movements have died down in the past few years, with an increasing number of ruling parties are pursuing Post-Islamist values. The Islamic State (hereafter “IS”), an Islamist extremist terrorist group grounded in Wahhabism⁵³, once occupied vast territories centered mostly in Iraq and Syria and even attacked major cities in Europe. However, with religious fervor subsiding and the IS causing much more harm than good, it has lost its footing as newer recruits were unavailable. Today, IS has been deemed

⁵² Volpi, *Political Islam: A Critical Reader*, 298.

⁵³ Siavash Saffari, "Political Islam and Political Violence," (Seoul National University, 2018), Powerpoint Slide.

defeated and this trend is visible in other extremist groups such as al-Qaeda. With violence causing destruction and with no end in sight, Islamists' popularity has subsided and peaceful solutions are sought after.

In conclusion, there are visible changes happening in political Islam. Both Turkey and Egypt and Iraq's transformation reflect how Islam's discourse has transformed from pursuing extremist goals to conforming to international standards. However, it has to be seen whether these countries have fully embraced these new values, or whether they are looking for an opportunity to return to their roots.

3.2 Rise of Islamism and Relationship with PAS

While PAS was born from Islamist values, it was not until the 1980s when the 'ulamas' took over that the PAS leadership adopted the extremist views it is campaigning today⁵⁴. While there were internal conflicts there were external effects as well that led to the rise of Islamism.

Islam has been a topic of scrutiny over the last few decades with the increased international community's interest in Islam's

⁵⁴ Abdullah, "Inclusion-moderation or Political Opportunity? Lessons from the Case of Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party, PAS)," 409.

violence and the Middle East political instability. From this instability grew a violent and extremist Islamic movement known as Islamism. Some major causes include the increasingly violent clashes between major Islam branches, especially the Sunni and Shia⁵⁵ and the United States intervention in the Middle East⁵⁶. However, with repeated failures of the Islamist movements, eventually it subsided and a new movement branched off known as Post-Islamism.

In the mid-1900s there has been a surge of Islamist movements that advanced their cause to establish the Islamic States. According to Asef Bayat, "Islamism refers to the ideologies and movements that, notwithstanding their variations, aim in general for the establishment of an 'Islamic order'— a religious state, Islamic laws, and moral codes. ... While the gradualist and reformist Islamists, such as the Muslim Brothers in Arab countries, pursue nonviolent methods of mobilizing civil society— through work in professional associations, NGOs, local mosques, and charities— the militant trends, such as al- Gama'a al- Islamiyya in Egypt, resort to armed struggle to seize state power."⁵⁷ The rise of Islamism, in the mid to late 1900s

⁵⁵ Volpi, *Political Islam: A Critical Reader*, 45.

⁵⁶ Adam Curtis, "The Power of Nightmares," (United Kingdom: BBC, 2004).

⁵⁷ Asef Bayat, *Life As Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middl*

has led many to believe that Islam is incompatible with the modern world and is constantly being criticized as backward. This rise of violent Islam was caused by both foreign and domestic events. In terms of foreign influence, the United States and the West has been responsible for funding radical terrorist groups for its own causes⁵⁸ and waging wars for its own interests. In the case of Saudi Arabia, the United States had entered into Mecca, which is considered to be one of the holiest sites in Islam tradition⁵⁹. The Middle East and other Muslims nations, including Malaysia, viewed this act as an attack and violation against Islam and this fueled the growth of radical Islamists who believed that they had to fight the West to protect the integrity of Islam. This convinced many Muslims that the West is the cause of endless turmoil of the Middle East. Internally, increasingly violent clashes between major Islam branches, especially the Sunni and Shia⁶⁰ which was sparked by the Battle of Karbala⁶¹, positioned branches to use more violent methods to undermine the other 'heretic'

e East, vol. Second Edition (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013), Book, 190.

⁵⁸ Curtis, "The Power of Nightmares."

⁵⁹ Volpi, *Political Islam: A Critical Reader*, 96.

⁶⁰ Volpi, *Political Islam: A Critical Reader*, 45.

⁶¹ Siavash Saffari, "Lebanon: Islamist and Post-Islamist Movements in the Middle East " (Seoul National University, 2018), Powerpoint Slide.

branches. In the case of Iran, there has been a rise of radical Shia believers, who believed that all Muslim believers should align themselves with the Shia branch. The conflict between the Sunni, who believed that all the caliphs after Muhammad were legitimate, and Shia, who believed that only Ali was the right heir to Muhammad as Caliph, has been ongoing for centuries, however, the rampant violent actions toward each other have been a fairly recent event. This view extended to establishing the Islamic State. The problem at hand was that there was an increasing belief that using violence in order to achieve its goals was justified. The Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979 gave Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the opportunity to implement his vision for the government, a government ruled by “guardianship of the jurist”. This has brewed conflict between the Shia and Sunni, and Khomeini did not hesitate to use force to pursue the goal⁶². The radicals had created justifications for their actions and believing what they are doing is right since their actions were sanctioned by “god”.

Inspired by the above events, the members of the future PAS believed that Islam was a mechanism to unite the people and expand its interests. Since PAS existed since the 1950s, PAS has espoused

⁶² Saffari, "Lebanon: Islamist and Post-Islamist Movements in the Middle East".

Islam, however, it remained mixed in its stance on Islamism until the 1980s. During this time, the Iranian Revolution inspired the ulumas to take control of PAS and create the identity it has today.

3.3 PAS Dilemma

The following graphs reflect PAS's support for its extremist policies. The basis for support and measure of moderation has been based on party statements, party slogans, party platforms, news, journals, and other sources that reveal PAS's stance on Islamic State and extremist laws. The first graph reveals the election results and alliances of PAS from 1986~2018. Throughout the years PAS has been a part of several alliances that have been composed of different parties. However, despite joining alliances, PAS has not alleviated its stance on establishing an Islamic State and implementing extremist laws.

PAS Election Outcome 1982–2018⁶³

Year	Leader	Alliance	Total Seats Won	Share of Seats Won	Total Votes	Share of Total Votes
1986	Yusof Rawa		1 / 177	0.56%	718,891	15.6%
1990	Fadzil Noor	Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah	7 / 180	3.89%	391,813	7.0%
1995	Fadzil Noor	Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah	7 / 192	3.65%	430,098	3.3%
1999	Abdul Hadi Awang	Barisan Alternatif	27 / 193	13.99%	994,279	14.99%
2004	Abdul Hadi Awang	Barisan Alternatif	7 / 219	3.20%	1,051,480	15.2%
2008	Abdul Hadi Awang	Pakatan Rakyat	23 / 222	10.36%	1,140,676	14.05%
2013	Abdul Hadi Awang	Pakatan Rakyat	21 / 222	9.46%	1,633,199	14.77%
2018	Abdul Hadi Awang	Gagasan Sejahtera	18 / 222	8.11%	2,032,080	17.89%

PAS and Support for Extremism

Year	Support for Islamic State	Support for Extreme Laws (ex. <i>hudud</i>)
1986	Support ⁶⁴⁶⁵⁶⁶	Support ⁶⁷
1990	Support ⁶⁸⁶⁹	Support ⁷⁰
1995	Support ⁷¹⁷²	Support ⁷³⁷⁴⁷⁵⁷⁶⁷⁷

⁶⁴ MGG Pillai, "Opposition Faces One-sided Contest," *The Times* (London, United Kingdom) 1986.

⁶⁵ Nicholas Cumming-Bruce, "Islamic Party Puts its Faith in Malay Voters," *The Guardian* (London, United Kingdom) 1986.

⁶⁶ Noor, *The Malaysian Islamic Party PAS 1951–2013: Islamism in a Mottled Nation*, 141.

⁶⁷ Noor, *The Malaysian Islamic Party PAS 1951–2013: Islamism in a Mottled Nation*, 147.

⁶⁸ Abdullah, "Inclusion–moderation or Political Opportunity? Lessons fro

m the Case of Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party, PAS)," 414.

⁶⁸ Abdullah, "Inclusion-moderation or Political Opportunity? Lessons from the Case of Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party, PAS)," 414.

⁶⁹ Noor, *The Malaysian Islamic Party PAS 1951-2013: Islamism in a Mottled Nation*, 138.

⁷⁰ Keith Richburg, "Islamic Resurgence Seen in Malaysia; Singapore, Indonesia Are Worried About Kuala Lumpur's Control," *The Washington Post* (Washington, D.C.) 1987.

⁷¹ "Malaysia in Islamic Row," *Sunday Herald Sun* (London, United Kingdom) 1992.

⁷² Salim Osmanin Tumpat, "Kelantan MB Holds Rural Crowd's Attention," *The Straits Times* (Singapore) 1995.

⁷³ "Malaysia in Islamic Row."

⁷⁴ David Chew, "Chinese Federation may Send Team to Meet Mahathir on Hudud Laws," *The Straits Times* (Singapore) 1993.

⁷⁵ Tumpat, "Kelantan MB Holds Rural Crowd's Attention."

⁷⁶ Noor, *The Malaysian Islamic Party PAS 1951-2013: Islamism in a Mottled Nation*, 147.

⁷⁷ Norshahril Saat, "Will PAS Governments in Kelantan and Terengganu Push for Islamic Laws," *ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute* 33, no. 2018 (2018): 2.

1999	Support ⁷⁸⁷⁹⁸⁰	Support ⁸¹
2004	Support ⁸²⁸³⁸⁴⁸⁵⁸⁶	Support ⁸⁷⁸⁸⁸⁹

⁷⁸ Abdullah, "Inclusion–moderation or Political Opportunity? Lessons from the Case of Parti Islam Se–Malaysia (Pan–Malaysian Islamic Party, PAS)," 415.

⁷⁹ Salim Osman, "PAS Preparing Ground for an Islamic State," *The Straits Times* (Singapore) 1999.

⁸⁰ Noor, *The Malaysian Islamic Party PAS 1951–2013: Islamism in a Mottled Nation*, 158.

⁸¹ Osman, "PAS Preparing Ground for an Islamic State."

⁸² Shamsul Akmar, "PAS and DAP at Impasse," *New Straits Times* (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia) 2000.

⁸³ Jocelin Tan, "Party Totems Turned into Bogeymen in KL Politics," *The Straits Times* (Singapore) 2001.

⁸⁴ Shamsul Akmar, "PAS' Islamic State Gambit," *New Straits Times* (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia) 2004.

⁸⁵ "The Islamic State Document," (Selangor, Malaysia: The Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS), 2003).

⁸⁶ Joseph Chinyong Liow, "Islamist Ambitions, Political Change, and the Price of Power: Recent Success and Challenges for the Pan–Malaysian Islamic Party, PAS," *Journal of Islamic Studies* 22, no. 3 (2011): 386, <https://doi.org/10.1093/jis/etr030>.

⁸⁷ Akmar, "PAS' Islamic State Gambit."

⁸⁸ "The Islamic State Document."

⁸⁹ Noor, *The Malaysian Islamic Party PAS 1951–2013: Islamism in a Mottled Nation*, 174.

2008	Support ⁹⁰⁹¹	Support ⁹²⁹³
2013	Abandon ⁹⁴⁹⁵⁹⁶	Abandon ⁹⁷⁹⁸

⁹⁰ Chow Kum Hor, "For the DAP it's Once Bitten, Twice Shy," *New Straits Times* (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia) 2006.

⁹¹ David Yeow, "MCA Slams PAS' Islamic State Plan," *New Straits Times* (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia) 2008.

⁹² Yeow, "MCA Slams PAS' Islamic State Plan."

⁹³ Noor, *The Malaysian Islamic Party PAS 1951–2013: Islamism in a Mottled Nation*, 213.

⁹⁴ Abdullah, "Inclusion–moderation or Political Opportunity? Lessons from the Case of Parti Islam Se–Malaysia (Pan–Malaysian Islamic Party, PAS)," 418.

⁹⁵ "Malaysia Election," *Al Jazeera* (Doha, Qatar) 2013, <https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/101east/2013/04/2013417101152169523.html>.

⁹⁶ Vikram Nehru and Van Tran, "Understanding Malaysia' s Pivotal General Election," *Carnegie Endowment* (Washington, D.C.) 2013, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2013/04/10/understanding-malaysia-s-pivotal-general-election-pub-51459>.

⁹⁷ Mohd Nasir Awang, "Negara Berkebajikan bukan agenda baru PAS," *Malaysia Today, Malaysia Today*, 2011, <https://www.malaysia-today.net/2011/06/06/negara-berkebajikan-bukan-agenda-baru-pas/>.

⁹⁸ "Buku Jingga ", (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia Pakatan Rakyat, 2010).

2018	Support ⁹⁹	Support ¹⁰⁰¹⁰¹¹⁰²¹⁰³
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Based on the data, PAS has clearly advocated the establishment of an Islamic State and extremist laws throughout the entirety of its election history, apart from the year 2013. This is the PAS Dilemma where it yearns to earn more votes however, it may not lose its extremism to be faithful to its loyalists.

The first part of the dilemma is because of the existence of

⁹⁹ Joseph Sipalan and John Chalmers, "Islamic Party Aims to Hold the Key in Malaysia's Election," *Reuters* (London, United Kingdom) 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-malaysia-election-islamic/islamic-party-aims-to-hold-the-key-in-malysias-election-idUSKBN1HT00R>.

¹⁰⁰ Al-Zaquan Amer Hamzah and Trinna Leong, "Malaysian Move Toward Harsher Islamic law divides Opposition," *Reuters* (London, United Kingdom) 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-malaysia-islam-law/malaysian-move-toward-harsher-islamic-law-divides-opposition-idUSKBN0ME0JJ20150318>.

¹⁰¹ Helen Ting, "UMNO's Hand in Malaysian Islamic Law," *East Asia Forum* (Acton, Australia) 2017, <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/06/06/umnos-hand-in-malaysian-islamic-law/>.

¹⁰² Praveen Menon, "Outrage in Multi-ethnic Malaysia as Government backs Islamic Law," *Reuters* (London, United Kingdom) 2016, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-malaysia-politics/outrage-in-multi-ethnic-malaysia-as-government-backs-islamic-law-idUSKCN0YJ04N>.

¹⁰³ Asrul Hadi Abdullah Sani, "PAS Wants Hudud Laws for Kelantan: What You Need to Know about the Laws," *The Straits Times* (Singapore) 2015, <https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/pas-wants-hudud-laws-for-kelantan-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-laws>.

UMNO. Ironically, PAS was created as an extension of UMNO, however, they turned on each other due to conflicting perceptions on the implementation of Islam. PAS and UMNO have been constantly clashing over the status as the legitimate party that represents Islam and Malaysians. This arms race for Islamization intensified with the inauguration of Mahathir Mohamad's first presidency. This arms race continued was even more emphasized during the recent 2018 elections, as Former President Najib Razak attempted to cater to the PAS loyalists. This is where the dilemma lies. The Kelantan State has always been the home ground for PAS and through most of recent history, and the Terengganu State has been mostly faithful toward PAS. However, if PAS ever moderates it risks losing these regions to UMNO. If PAS ever abandons its stance on Islamic State and hudud, there is no real distinguishing factor between UMNO and PAS. Therefore, the people of Kelantan and Terengganu has no reason to vote for PAS and vote for the much larger and influential UMNO to reflect its interests.

The second part of the dilemma is in other regions. As a political party, PAS has always desired to spread its influence out of Kelantan and Terengganu and at times even attempted to do so in the form of joining coalitions and at times softening its stance of the Islamic State, however never abandoning it. However, without

abandoning its support for establishing an Islamic State and implementation of the hudud, it will never be able to do achieve success out of Kelantan and Terrengganu. Most of the other states are heavily populated by Chinese, Indian and other minority ethnicities and each ethnicity believed in their own religion. With PAS actively supporting Islam and Bumiputra, other states would naturally reject PAS as a political party.

Based on these two dilemmas, under the current status quo, moderation is not an option for PAS. It can neither go forward or backward or it risks losing popularity, so it will have to tread lightly.

Ethnic Composition of Malaysia¹⁰⁴

Ethnicity	1991	2000	2010
Bumiputera	60.6%	65.1%	67.4%
Chinese	28.1%	26.0%	24.6%
Indians	7.9%	7.7%	7.3%
Others	3.4%	1.2%	0.7%

¹⁰⁴ "Population Distribution and Basic Demographic Characteristic Report , " (Putrajaya, Malaysia: Department of Statistics, Malaysia).

Ethnic Composition by State¹⁰⁵

State	2000			2010		
	Bumiputra (%)	Chinese (%)	Indian (%)	Bumiputra (%)	Chinese (%)	Indian (%)
Johor	57.1	35.4	6.9	58.9	33.6	7.1
Kedah	76.6	14.9	7.1	77.9	13.6	7.3
Kelantan	95	3.8	0.3	95.7	3.4	0.3
Malacca	62.8	30.1	6.5	66.9	26.4	6.2
Negeri Sembilan	57.9	25.6	16	61.3	23.2	15.2
Pahang	76.8	17.7	5	79	16.2	4.4
Penang	42.5	46.5	10.6	43.6	45.6	10.4
Perak	54.7	32	13	57	30.4	12.2
Perlis	85.5	10.3	1.3	88.4	8	1.2
Selangor	53.5	30.7	14.6	57.1	28.6	13.5
Terengganu	96.8	2.8	0.2	97	2.6	0.2
Sabah	80.5	13.2	0.5	84.8	12.8	0.3
Sarawak	72.9	26.7	0.2	74.8	24.5	0.3
FT Kuala Lumpur	43.6	43.5	11.4	45.9	43.2	10.3
FT Labuan	79.6	15.8	1.3	83.7	13.4	0.9
FT Putrajaya	94.8	1.8	2.7	98	0.7	1.2

3.4 2013

The year of 2013 was the only time that PAS had clearly moderated its stance on the Islamic State and Hudud. The 2013 Election was the first time that BN had a real change of losing. For this opportunity PAS stopped mentioning the Islamic State and espoused a Welfare State¹⁰⁶. In this case, a Welfare State is not the

¹⁰⁵ "Population Distribution and Basic Demographic Characteristic Report ."

¹⁰⁶ Abdullah, "Inclusion—moderation or Political Opportunity? Lessons fr

commonly known Nordic countries, but rather a message calling for unity among the diverse ethnicities within Malaysia. With Najib Razak mired in controversies sprouted from corruption and bias towards Malaysians. Only with a absolute assurance of a political opportunity would PAS moderate as it has. However, the tables turned for PAS as UMNO did everything within its power to hold onto its power ranging from mob-like threats¹⁰⁷ to media control¹⁰⁸.

Chapter4: Conclusion

The world has been a trend of extremist political parties shift from Islamism to Post-Islamism, by embracing or accommodating broader and/or liberal values. Despite the changing world trend PAS has remained a heavy advocate for an Islamic State and hudud since its inception. As a political party, it has made efforts to spread out of the home states mostly in the form of joining alliances and in one

om the Case of Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party, PAS)," 416.

¹⁰⁷ Susan Loone, "Kumpulan ganggu ceramah DAP, jurugambar ditumbuk," *Malaysiakini* (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia) 2013, <https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/227951>.

¹⁰⁸ "Access to Malaysiakini 'restricted' by ISPs," *Malaysiakini* (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia) 2013, <https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/228203>.

instance even abandoning its support or at least remaining silent on the issue of establishing an Islamic State. However, PAS is doomed to maintain its current stance and will not have the choice of moderating. This is due to the structural reasons for balancing between UMNO and its loyal states. Some factors that may change PAS's future is a potential solid alliance with UMNO. For the first time in modern Malaysian history, UMNO is no longer the ruling party and will need new strategies to win the next election, and a potential alliance with PAS seems to be a potential partner. However, PAS must be wary to not be absorbed into the massive UMNO party. With Malaysia heading off with a new ruling party, people should expect the unexpected. There are limitations to the argument. The first limitation is the measure of moderation. The treatment of moderation here is black and white and does not take into consideration the softening of moderation. Therefore, the graph would not consider how heavily PAS has advocated for Islamic States, or how many times it has mentioned it.

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초록

21세기로 접어들면서 전 세계 극단주의 이슬람 단체들의 외압과 내부 압력에 적응하기 위해 온건해지고 있는 움직임이 눈에 띄게 나타나고 있다. 그러나 말레이시아의 이슬람 정당인 PAS는 온건을 저항해 왔고, 보다 구체적으로는 이슬람 국가와 '후두드'인 극단주의 전통 이슬람법 제정을 적극 옹호해 왔다. PAS는 로버트 미셸스의 포괄-온건이론에 입각하여 사회에 적응하여 이해와 영향력 영역을 확대했어야 했다. PAS의 경우, 온건의 기준은 이슬람국가의 성립과 '후두드'의 이행을 옹호를 멈추는 걸을 의미한다. 선거 때마다 참여했음에도 불구하고 PAS는 포괄-온건 이론의 예상을 깨고 그 입장을 견지해 왔다. 본 논문은 PAS의 굳건함과 2013년 총선거에서 기회주의적 이유를 분석하고자 한다.

주요어 : Inclusion-moderation thesis, Islamism, Malaysia, PAS, UMNO

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